The Supreme Court’s recent ruling holding that limiting participation to delegates is unconstitutional and requiring political parties to expand participation in their parliamentary and presidential primaries to all members in good standing is among the most consequential rulings in Ghana’s Fourth Republic.

What makes the moment even more striking is that, just a day after the ruling, the Government released its position paper on the recommendations of the Prof. Kwasi Prempeh Constitution Review Committee, and in it endorsed both the Court’s decision and the CRC’s call for broader participation. In granting political parties a one-year period to amend their constitutions, rules, and electoral processes, the apex court did more than simply interpret the Constitution: it created a rare constitutional moment—an opening for Ghana to fundamentally reform its political finance architecture and confront one of the gravest threats to democratic governance: the escalating cost of politics.

The ruling is firmly grounded in the 1992 Constitution. Article 55(2) guarantees every citizen the right to participate in a political activity intended to shape government, while Article 55(5) requires that “the internal organization of a political party shall conform to democratic principles.” Restricting primaries to a small body of delegates is difficult to reconcile with these guarantees of broad participation and internal democracy. For decades, Ghana’s delegate system has been plagued by vote buying, bribery, patronage, intimidation, and commercialization. Because only a few delegates determined outcomes, aspirants concentrated vast financial resources on influencing individuals rather than persuading the wider membership through ideas, competence, and policy proposals. The Court’s ruling disrupts this incentive structure and compels a shift toward grassroots mobilization, policy debates, issue-based campaigning, and sustained party organization.

This reform is urgent because the cost of politics has reached unsustainable levels. Research by the Ghana Centre for Democratic Development (CDD-Ghana) found that parliamentary candidates in 2020 spent, on average, more than GH¢4 million to secure nomination and contest seats, while presidential primaries and national campaigns can exceed US$100 million, approximately GH¢579 million. Few candidates can self-finance at this scale, leaving them dependent on wealthy patrons whose support often comes with expectations of future rewards. As one key informant in the CDD-Ghana study, a financier, candidly stated: “I finance candidates for president and parliament on the ticket of both the NDC and NPP to ensure I get new contracts and protect the contracts I received from a previous government if there is a change of government. So far, things have been good for me and my business” (p. 45).

Ghana’s political finance laws exacerbate the problem. Unlike several democracies, Ghana does not require parliamentary or presidential candidates to disclose campaign donations, identify financiers, or file expenditure returns. While parties submit some financial statements under the Political Parties Act, 2000 (Act 574), individual candidates remain outside any meaningful disclosure regime. This opacity fosters conflicts of interest, corruption, and state capture. Once elected, officials may feel compelled to reward financiers through inflated contracts, procurement favors, tax concessions, or appointments. Others simply seek to recover personal campaign debts. Ultimately, taxpayers bear the cost through the use of state resources to pay back financiers or a recovery of campaign debts.

The Supreme Court’s ruling should therefore be seen not only as a judgment on internal party democracy but as an opening for Parliament to enact a comprehensive Campaign Finance legislation under the political finance architecture. Article 55(17) empowers Parliament to regulate political parties by law. Having clarified constitutional principles, the judgment now places renewed constitutional and political responsibility on Parliament to enact comprehensive campaign finance legislation. Such legislation should require disclosure of campaign donations and identification of significant donors, detailed expenditure reports, spending limits, and audited post-election returns. It should also establish defined campaign periods, such as sixty days before polling day, though the CRC recommended 120 days. Comparatively, Ivory Coast limits campaigns to fourteen days, Cabo Verde to eleven, and Nigeria to ninety. Limiting the campaign period would substantially reduce expenditure, discourage perpetual campaigning, and create a more level playing field for candidates without vast financial resources, including women, youth and persons who are differently-abled.

Equally important, the law must prohibit the abuse of state resources for campaign purposes, including the use of government vehicles, public funds, state personnel, public facilities, and official communication platforms. State resources belong to the people of Ghana, not to political parties or incumbents. The legislation must also close another gap by criminalizing vote buying, bribery, and undue influence in internal party elections. Extending criminal liability to primaries would reinforce the Court’s objective of genuine internal democracy and reduce the monetization of candidate selection.

Critics argue that expanding participation will impose logistical and financial burdens on parties and increase the risk of infiltration by rival members. These concerns, though valid, are surmountable. Public funding for internal party primaries, tied to strict auditing, disclosure, and compliance requirements, can ease burdens, while existing electoral infrastructure can be adapted to support inclusive primaries. Infiltration concerns can be addressed through credible, verifiable membership registers, periodic audits, and transparent updating procedures. Ultimately, expanding participation alone will not end monetization of politics; it must be accompanied by transparent finance rules, expenditure limits, disclosure requirements, independent oversight, and strong enforcement.

The CRC recommended establishing an Independent Registrar and Regulator of Political Parties and Campaigns to expand the Electoral Commission’s role with stronger enforcement powers. Government accepted the principle in its position paper but preferred the designation Political Parties Regulatory Commission. This body would regulate campaign costs, enforce disclosure, sanction abuse of incumbency, and administer a Democracy Fund to support parties’ non-electioneering activities.

Parliament now has one year to act. Failure to enact comprehensive campaign finance reforms would broaden participation in internal party elections without addressing the underlying drivers of corruption, undue influence, and state capture. The reform agenda must therefore go beyond expanding the electorate. It should be anchored in universal participation by members in good standing, transparent campaign finance rules, mandatory disclosure by candidates of campaign donations and election expenditures, regulated campaign periods, public funding for constitutionally compliant internal party primaries, and the criminalization of vote buying and the abuse of state resources in internal party elections. Together, these measures would reshape Ghana’s political incentives, making merit—not money—the dominant currency of democratic competition.

The Supreme Court has done what courts are constitutionally mandated to do: interpret the Constitution and uphold the democratic rights of party members. The responsibility now shifts to Parliament. If lawmakers simply expand participation without confronting the corrosive influence of money in politics, Ghana risks replacing one flawed system with another. This constitutional moment presents a rare opportunity to strengthen both internal party democracy and the integrity of the country’s electoral system. Genuine democratic reform requires more than wider participation; it demands politics that are transparent, accountable, affordable, and driven by ideas rather than financial power. Parliament must not let this opportunity pass.

The author, William Nyarko, is the Executive Director of the Africa Centre for International Law and Accountability (ACILA)