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Border closures don’t always produce the intended objectives. The idea is usually to control illegal movements and prohibited goods, lessen informal trade, reinforce customs operations, and regain control of national borders. But history shows that in cases as diverse as England, the Asante Kingdom, the US and colonial Nigeria/Benin, stiffer border regulations can instead bring about smuggling and multiply criminal networks.

Where people share ethnic, language and kinship ties across state boundaries, closures disrupt everyday livelihood structures. Where state institutions are weak, corruption disrupts the enforcement processes. The rules become a means of private gain. Closures create artificial scarcity, inflate operational hurdles and drive demand towards underground operators and networks.

Nigeria presents a rich case to explain how border closures work in unstructured, corruption-prone and vulnerable economies.

I’m a peace, conflict, security and development researcher with an interest in border and security politics. In a recently published research article we show that Nigeria’s 2019 border closure did not disrupt or destroy smuggling networks. It reorganised them. The policy increased informal interactions at checkpoints, multiplied illegal routes, and heightened unrestricted power of poorly supervised state agents.

The closure intensified what has been described as “checkpoint politics”. This refers to the exchanges between state officials and non-state actors or border users over who passes and who does not, what moves and what does not, and at what price. It captures how borders actually operate, and challenges the idea that the closure was a success.

The research emphasises the need to reconsider border control approaches by giving closer attention to the local political economy of borderlands.

Nigeria as a border closure case study

Nigeria is a good setting to study the relationship between border closures and smuggling, for six reasons.

One, Nigeria has vast and vulnerable land borders with neighbours, including Benin, Cameroon, Chad and Niger.

Two, these borderlands feature communities that have strong ethnic and cultural affinities across the countries. Such include the Hausa in Nigeria and Niger as well as the Yoruba in Nigeria and Benin. These affinities sustain networks of informal exchanges despite state restrictions.

Three, unregulated and illicit trade has long been woven into the fabric of Nigeria’s political and economic systems, giving rise to structural black markets and influential industry spaces.

Four, systemic graft among border and security officials has frequently compromised enforcement outcomes while facilitating black markets.

Five, closure policies potentially conflict with regional integration frameworks.

Six, it has actually happened. Nigeria’s 2019 border closure sheds light on the consequences of closure policies for smuggling, inflation, local production, security, state legitimacy and regional relations.

The 2019 border closure

In August 2019, the Nigerian government closed its land borders with neighbouring countries, including Benin Republic, to end rampant smuggling (including small arms).

The policy affected many borderlands, including Seme and Idiroko. These borders are among the busiest trade corridors in west Africa.

Some portrayed the policy as a huge success. They claimed it reduced the influx of foreign goods like rice and poultry products. They also said it protected local farmers and improved national security.

However, underneath this claim lies a more complicated reality, as our research shows.

Our research

Our study drew from interviews, archival material, government documents and newspaper reports. It also drew from academic literature to identify patterns in border practices and policy implementation on the border. The field study lasted between March 2020 and July 2022.

The study shows that the 2019 border closure underestimated “checkpoint politics”. It intensified informal practices like bribery and selective enforcement. Personal and community networks, small scale and fragmented trading, and informal brokerage continued.

Alternative smuggling strategies allowed goods and people to continue crossing the border. People used unofficial crossing points and paths, and transferred goods through multiple intermediaries. Modes and timing of transport shifted and people used social rather than commercial means of mobility.

The World Bank estimated that the closure severely disrupted formal cross-border trade.

The study suggests that traders, smugglers, local residents and state officials collaborated to overcome official border governance structures. Some of the people we interviewed alleged that state officials enabled the passage of contraband goods across checkpoints. Transport operators negotiated payments with border officials in exchange for passage.

Border controls were less about formal rules and more about informal negotiations and financial exchanges.

The Nigeria-Benin frontier is extremely porous. There are hundreds of unofficial routes that are difficult to monitor. Besides, logistical weaknesses, poor infrastructure, inadequate manpower and low salaries among border officials contribute to corruption and weak enforcement.

Reality of border governance

Our findings show that border closure fails when it ignores the daily political and economic dynamics operating in the borders. These dynamics include: negotiated enforcement, rent-seeking and informal payments, cross-border livelihood dependence, and transborder social and kinship networks.

Many policy discussions concentrate on non-state actors as the drivers of illicit cross-border activities. But our research highlights the role of state actors themselves. By implication, the state is not merely a victim of illicit cross-border activities but may be complicit in enabling them.

Particularly, the research draws attention to the economic and social consequences of border closures. Apart from disrupting livelihoods dependent on cross-border trade, it contributed to a rise in food prices and other essentials because local production could not meet domestic demand. Security-oriented border policies can have unintended economic and social effects.

The study highlights the weaknesses of border governance strategies in regions that have long-standing transnational networks, informal trade systems and porous boundaries.

Moving forward

To achieve effectiveness and efficiency, border management should shift from total closures to smart governance that separates illegal smuggling from daily community cross border movement. This calls for intelligence-led enforcement against organised smuggling while expanding legal and accessible channels for small-scale cross-border trade. Regional cooperation and modern border management would help achieve this.

Such an approach would tend to reduce incentives around unofficial routes and the discretionary checkpoint negotiations. This would allow enforcement resources to focus on genuinely illicit activities.

Also, efficient collaboration among border agencies is crucial. This is because fragmented responsibilities among border control agencies could lead to overlapping mandates and weak enforcement systems. It is necessary to improve communication and reduce bureaucratic inefficiencies.

Similarly, stronger regional cooperation between Nigeria and its neighbours in joint border patrols, intelligence sharing, and harmonised trade policies could enhance border governance.

In the past, Onyekachi E. Nnabuihe had received funding from the Brown International Advanced Research Institutes, Watson Institute, Brown University, Centre for African Studies, University of Edinburg, Carnegie Corporation of New York to conduct research. However, the present study was self funded as a staff of Caleb University, Imota, Lagos.

By Onyekachi E. Nnabuihe, Senior Lecturer, Department of Criminology, Security, Peace and Conflict Studies, Caleb University