The IMF’s concerns about Ghana’s Domestic Gold Purchase Programme deserve serious attention. According to the Fund, the programme generated substantial losses for the Bank of Ghana, reportedly reaching about GH¢22 billion, or approximately US$1.7 billion, in 2025.

If these losses resulted from trading activities, fees, exchange-rate movements and weaknesses in the programme’s design, Ghana should not dismiss them. Public resources are involved, and transparency and accountability are essential.

But acknowledging the losses should not end the discussion.

The IMF itself has recognised that Ghana’s gold programme also produced important benefits. It contributed to rebuilding international reserves, supported foreign-exchange availability and helped formalise parts of the artisanal gold trade during a difficult period for the economy.

The real question, therefore, is not simply whether the programme lost money. The more important question is whether the economic benefits justified the costs—and whether Ghana could have achieved those benefits at a substantially lower cost.

Losses Must Be Examined in Context
A financial loss on the Bank of Ghana’s balance sheet is serious, but it does not necessarily provide a complete measure of the programme’s economic value to Ghana.

What was the value of the additional reserves accumulated? How much did the programme contribute to foreign-exchange availability and currency stability? How much gold was brought into formal export channels? And could these achievements have been obtained more efficiently?

These questions do not challenge the IMF’s findings. They complete the analysis.

A policy can pursue a sound strategic objective while being badly implemented. If that is what happened, Ghana should correct the mechanism rather than automatically abandon the strategy.

Does the IMF Interfere in Ghana’s Affairs?

It is tempting to interpret IMF criticism as foreign interference. But the situation is more complicated.

Ghana voluntarily entered an IMF programme after experiencing a severe economic and debt crisis. The IMF therefore has legitimate reasons to examine policies that could affect Ghana’s fiscal and monetary stability.

The Fund also scrutinises developed economies such as the United States, United Kingdom and Japan. The difference is one of economic power.

The United States can disagree with an IMF recommendation and largely continue on its chosen path. Ghana, when dependent on IMF financing, debt restructuring and international creditor confidence, has much less room to do so.

That is why Ghana should be more concerned about why it repeatedly becomes dependent on the IMF than about the fact that the IMF gives it advice.

Economic Sovereignty Must Be Built
Ghana is rich in gold, cocoa, oil, gas and other resources. Yet the country has repeatedly experienced debt crises, foreign-exchange shortages and currency instability.

This cannot always be blamed on external institutions.

Fiscal indiscipline, excessive borrowing, inefficient expenditure, corruption, weak institutions and short-term political decision-making have contributed to Ghana’s vulnerability.

A country that repeatedly requires external financial rescue inevitably gives external institutions greater influence over its policies.

Economic sovereignty, therefore, cannot simply mean telling the IMF to stay out of Ghana’s affairs. It means building an economy strong enough not to require repeated rescue.

Ghana Must Still Think for Itself
At the same time, Ghana should not assume that every IMF recommendation automatically represents the best long-term development policy.

The IMF understandably focuses on fiscal discipline, price stability and central-bank independence. Ghana needs all three. But Ghana also needs industrialisation, employment, value addition and structural transformation.

This is particularly relevant to gold.
Ghana has exported gold for generations and remains one of Africa’s major producers. Yet the country repeatedly experiences foreign-exchange shortages.

That contradiction should concern us.
The lesson from the Domestic Gold Purchase Programme should therefore not necessarily be to abandon the strategic use of Ghana’s gold. It may instead be to design a better system—one that protects the Bank of Ghana, reduces trading risks and retains the benefits of stronger reserves and formalised gold exports.

GoldBod or any institution performing this function must consequently operate with transparency, professional risk management and strong independent oversight. Moving losses from the Bank of Ghana to another public institution would solve nothing.

Listen to the IMF, but Ghana Must Decide

Ghana should listen carefully when the IMF identifies genuine weaknesses. If public money has been unnecessarily lost, there must be accountability and reform.

But Ghana should not outsource its economic thinking.

The IMF should be an adviser and partner, not Ghana’s economic planning ministry.

Ghana must develop the capacity to examine IMF recommendations, accept those that serve the national interest, modify those that require adaptation and reject those that do not fit the country’s long-term development strategy.

The objective should neither be confrontation with the IMF nor unquestioning compliance.

It should be to build an economy strong enough for Ghana to say:

“We understand your concerns. We have examined the evidence and corrected the weaknesses. But Ghana will ultimately pursue the policies that best serve its long-term national interest.”

That is what economic sovereignty should mean.

Dr. Isaac Yaw Asiedu
https://rethinkingafrica.org