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The movement of tens of thousands people into Ceuta, the Spanish enclave on the north African coast, in July 2026 has highlighted faultlines in the politics of migration between Europe and Morocco.

More than 70,000 people entered Ceuta over a 48-hour period. The extraordinary surge followed the spread of misleading claims on social media that people who reached Ceuta by sea could not be returned to Morocco. An estimated 57 people died. Most drowned while trying to swim around the border breakwater.

Ceuta is on the African continent and borders Morocco. It has a population of about 83,600 people, 40% of whom are of Moroccan origin. The city’s reception facilities were already overwhelmed as around 1,500 people had arrived the previous week. Facilities for unaccompanied minors were operating at 2,400% of their capacity.

I am a researcher on north African migration issues, and in my view, the Ceuta situation is about more than migration. It reflects the complicated political relationship between Spain, Morocco and the European Union, and deep structural inequalities.

Understanding the unfolding crisis requires looking at both the international and domestic dimensions.

International attention needs to be paid to Europe’s outsourcing of border controls, and to the geopolitical relationship between Spain and Morocco. Domestically, the crisis raises questions about illegal migration, pressure on public services, and the political and media narratives surrounding migration.

The international dimension

Migration has become a source of political leverage. American political scientist Kelly M. Greenhill calls this coercive engineered migration: the deliberate use – or threat of using – migration flows to pressure other states into making concessions.

In Ceuta, this dynamic is part of a broader pattern.

In May 2021, for instance, more than 5,000 people entered Ceuta after Morocco eased border controls. This followed a diplomatic crisis triggered by Spain’s decision to allow Brahim Ghali, the leader of the Polisario Front, to receive medical treatment in the country. The Polisario Front seeks independence for the Sahara, a territory claimed and recovered by Morocco since 1975.

Morocco considered Spain’s decision to receive Ghali as support for its political adversary. Relations between the two countries deteriorated sharply. Morocco subsequently relaxed controls on its border with Ceuta, which allowed thousands of people to cross into the Spanish enclave. Spain accused Morocco of using migration to pile on political pressure.

Morocco’s leverage in this situation has been amplified by Europe’s outsourcing of migration control. Rather than managing migration only at its own borders, the European Union has increasingly relied on countries like Morocco to prevent people from reaching Europe in the first place.

Further, some politicians have framed the 2026 Ceuta arrivals as an “invasion” or a threat to national security. This has contributed to the process of “securitisation”, an approach that tends to prioritise state security over the safety and rights of migrants themselves.

The European Parliament has condemned the use of migration as a tool of political gains.

The outsourcing of migration control has made Morocco an essential partner for the European Union. But it has also made the union increasingly dependent on Morocco to prevent migrants from reaching European territory.

In 2023, the European Commission allocated 152 million euros to strengthen Morocco’s border management. By transferring part of its responsibilities, Europe has given Morocco real leverage over migration cooperation.

This dependence creates a dilemma for the European Union. Morocco’s importance in curbing migration can make it harder for European governments to challenge the country over other matters in the future.

The domestic dimension

A Spanish court ruling may have played a role in the July 2026 crossings. The supreme court ruled out the use of the exceptional “rejection at the border” procedure for people intercepted at sea trying to enter Ceuta and Melilla by swimming.

The court found that this procedure applies to people crossing physical border barriers, such as the fences surrounding the enclaves, rather than those intercepted while swimming.

This decision was misinterpreted by many in Morocco. Its simplified interpretation may have encouraged crossings by creating the impression that those arriving by swimming would not be sent back. According to the Spanish prime minister, smuggling networks exploited this court ruling.

Large-scale border crossings can also change the way migration is discussed. One study into the 2021 Ceuta crisis found a hardening of political rhetoric and a growing normalisation of racist language. Further, the far-right Spanish party Vox devoted more than 70% of its social media posts to Ceuta and migration.

The current crisis has revived similar rhetoric. Far-right politicians have used words like “invasion” and “men of fighting age”, contributing to portraying migrants as a collective threat to Spanish citizens. The media are not necessarily the source of this rhetoric. But they can help normalise it. This can happen when they repeat alarmist narratives without sufficient context or perspective.

Human rights as limit and response

In a crisis of Ceuta’s nature, human rights are not an obstacle to border management. They set the legal and ethical limits. Finding more than 50 bodies in the waters off Ceuta shows the human cost of turning a border into a zone of extreme danger.

Spain has a duty to protect human lives and ensure effective rescue operations. It also must assess each case individually, with particular attention to minors, asylum seekers and victims of human trafficking.

The primary victims remain the migrants themselves. Political parties may exploit them for electoral gain. Public narratives may reduce them to an anonymous threat.

While states squabble over influence and responsibilities, migrants face inadequate protection, arbitrary pushbacks and dehumanisation in public debate.

The response should not pit the rights of Ceuta’s residents against those of the people arriving there. It should protect both groups, while giving particular attention to the most vulnerable. They should not pay the price for political strategies over which they have no control.

Moha Ennaji does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

By Moha Ennaji, Professor, Université Sidi Mohammed Ben Abdellah