“Public accountability is not an act of aggression. It is the constitutional price of exercising public power.”

Ghana’s democracy does not weaken because difficult questions are asked. It weakens when asking them becomes politically dangerous. The controversy surrounding GoldBod and the Bank of Ghana’s Domestic Gold Purchase Programme is therefore not merely a partisan quarrel. It is a constitutional test: whether public institutions still possess the discipline to reconcile public loss, public authority and public explanation under the sovereignty of evidence.

At the centre of the debate lies a stark figure: US$1.7 billion. According to the IMF’s Ghana: Selected Issues, Country Report No. 26/213, the DGPP generated losses exceeding 1.5% of GDP in 2025. Paragraph 13 of the report is unambiguous: the losses were tied almost entirely to Gold-for-Reserves doré purchases, amounting to 17% of the value of doré gold sold. The components included service and assay fees paid to GoldBod, discounts granted to off-takers, and exchange-rate differences between purchase and accounting rates.

These findings do not prove criminal wrongdoing. But they do establish a documented, substantial public-programme loss within a state-administered mechanism involving public money, public institutions and public risk. That alone demands parliamentary scrutiny.

What the IMF Did — and Did Not — Say

The IMF did not attribute the entire US$1.7 billion loss to GoldBod. The loss sits on the Bank of Ghana’s programme, not GoldBod’s standalone accounts. Fact-checking confirms that GoldBod acted as a paid buying agent, while the Bank of Ghana absorbed programme-level costs.

GoldBod’s reported GH¢907 million operational surplus — and its broader GH¢5.4 billion surplus including government equity — does not end the inquiry. A corporate surplus and a public-programme loss can coexist. One reflects an entity’s financial position; the other reflects the economic cost of a state policy.

The constitutional questions therefore remain: Who set the purchasing and selling prices? Who authorised discounts? How were off-takers selected? What proportion of the loss was realised, and what proportion was valuation? Were the programme’s macroeconomic benefits proportionate to its cost?

Only institutional reconciliation can answer these questions.

Policy Benefits Do Not Cancel Financial Scrutiny

The IMF acknowledged that the DGPP helped formalise artisanal gold exports, rebuild reserves and support foreign-exchange stabilisation. These are real benefits. But policy benefits do not immunise programmes from examination. The constitutional inquiry is whether comparable benefits could have been achieved at lower cost, with narrower discounts, stronger controls or reduced quasi-fiscal exposure.

Public oversight exists to distinguish necessary sacrifice from avoidable loss.

Contact Is Not Extortion
Some argue that the Minority Leader should have confined himself to parliamentary channels. But seeking clarification from a public institution is not culpability. Extortion requires proof of act, demand, intention and context — none of which can be inferred from mere communication.

Political misjudgment, procedural excess and criminal conduct are legally distinct. Only evidence can bridge the gap.

The Constitutional Architecture of Scrutiny

Articles 175–178 of the 1992 Constitution treat public funds as a national trust, not institutional property. Withdrawals must be authorised by law. The Public Financial Management Act, 2016 (Act 921) reinforces this through parliamentary oversight, budget approval, performance reporting and strict rules governing the use of public money.

Demanding an explanation for a loss equal to 1.5% of GDP is not political trespass. It is Parliament’s constitutional duty.

Articles 115–116 protect parliamentary speech to ensure that scrutiny can occur without intimidation. Privilege exists to protect rigorous inquiry, not reckless accusation. The strongest defence of the Minority Leader is not politics — it is accuracy: the IMF identified a substantial programme loss and explicitly referenced fees paid to GoldBod.

Scrutiny Is Not Criminalisation
A valuation loss is not theft. An exchange-rate difference is not corruption. A costly policy is not automatically unlawful. But an audited surplus cannot erase a programme-level loss carried elsewhere in the public financial system. The constitutional task is to trace authority, decisions, benefits, costs and responsibility.

A Credible Inquiry Must Be Forensic, Not Partisan

A professional parliamentary inquiry must examine:

• gold-purchasing agreements;
• off-taker agreements and selection;
• discounts and authorisations;
• service and assay fees paid to GoldBod;
• pricing and exchange-rate methodology;
• realised vs. valuation losses;
• financing and sterilisation costs;
• allocation of financial risk;
• internal approvals and controls;
• measurable macroeconomic benefits;
• proportionality of public cost.

If the programme is vindicated, that conclusion must be stated plainly. If avoidable losses or improper conduct are found, accountability must follow with equal clarity.

Let the Ledger Speak
The opposition’s deepest obligation is not reflexive resistance — it is ensuring that government explains what power has done with public trust. Government’s corresponding obligation is not resentment of scrutiny — it is answering scrutiny with records, reasons and candour.

Truth does not fear an audit. Integrity does not resent a question.

A republic that discourages difficult questions is travelling in the wrong constitutional direction. The constitutional answer is neither persecution nor propaganda. It is disclosure, due process and accountability — and the courage to ask, matched by the discipline to answer.

About author:
By Sam Kwesi Andoh
Executive Director, SKA Legal Consult Ltd